What Works in Reducing Burglary: A Review of Secured by Design by Armitage, Rachel
University of Huddersfield Repository
Armitage, Rachel
What Works in Reducing Burglary: A Review of Secured by Design
Original Citation
Armitage, Rachel (2017) What Works in Reducing Burglary: A Review of Secured by Design. In: 
What Works in Crime Reduction Conference, 24th January 2017, London, UK. (Unpublished) 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/31236/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not­for­profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) and 
Secured by Design (SBD): What Works?
Professor Rachel Armitage
Director: Secure Societies Institute
Today’s presentation
• What Works review of Secured by Design (SBD) led by
UCL (Aiden Sidebottom) – March/April.
• Focus today on my research:
– Impact of CPTED on police recorded crime.
– Impact of CPTED on offender decision making.
– Effectiveness of SBD.
– Some discussion of challenges of evaluating what works.
Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) 
What is it?
A method of reducing crime through the 
design and manipulation of the built 
environment (planning stage)   
Houses
Schools
Hospitals
Commercial 
Railway stations
Creating Defensible Space 
Use of design to create symbolic barriers that portray the message that an 
area is private. 
Limiting through movement
Less opportunities to notice the house. 
Less access/escape routes.
Maximising surveillance 
Offenders are more likely to be observed (or feel like that are being observed) 
by neighbours and/or passers by. 
Management and maintenance
The area is well maintained giving the impression that people care and would 
challenge the offender if observed. 
Standards of physical security
The house is difficult to get into. Doing so would take time and would be 
likely to raise suspicion.  
Locks, doors, windows meet certain standards. 
Secured by Design: 
Standards based on principles of CPTED
Surveillance 
Movement control  
Physical security  Defensible space  Secured by Design – Gold 
Secured by 
Design – Silver 
Implementing CPTED/SBD in the UK
How is CPTED delivered in the UK
• Each police force has
ALO/CPDA/DOCOs.
• Traditionally warranted police, but
move towards civilian role (GMP)
• Police station/local authority
planning dept.
• Review planning applications,
advice on crime risk, deliver SBD,
influence planning policy/strategy.
• Jan 2009 – 347
• Nov 2014 - 125
Architectural Liaison Officer 
Crime Prevention Design Advisor 
Designing out Crime Officer
Individual design elements CPTED/SBD – Individual 
elements of Design 
What works?
Police recorded crime 
Which design features influence crime?
31 design features specific to the property
19 design features specific to the wider 
development
2193 houses
12 developments
Across 3 police forces
Police recorded crime data for 3 years 
Through movement
Compared to a true cul-de-sac, through roads experienced 93% more crime. 
Compared to a true cul-de-sac, leaky culs-de-sac experienced 110% more crime. 
Road layout 
Being located on a corner plot increased risk of crime by 18%. 
Surveillance
Properties overlooked by 3 or more other properties experienced 38% less crime
Individual design elements 
Individual design elements CPTED/SBD – Individual 
elements of Design 
What works?
Offender decision making
What works...in the words of the offender?
• 22 adult prolific burglars currently serving a prison sentence
(Whealston, Armley, Newhall).
• 16 photographs:
“From what you can see from the photo, 
can you describe what would attract you to this property when selecting a 
target for burglary”
“From what you can see from the photo, 
can you describe what would deter you (put you off) from selecting this 
property as a target for burglary”
The principles of CPTED
Surveillance
Secured by Design Homes 
“For the majority of housing developments, it will be desirable for 
dwelling frontages to be open to view, so walls, fences and hedges will 
need to be kept low” 
“Planting should not impede the opportunity for natural surveillance”.
“Dwellings should be positioned facing each other to allow neighbours
to easily view their surroundings”.

Surveillance –
don’t like clear visibility
This is a burglar’s dream house! 
The hedge is high and blocks the 
view from the road. The gate is so 
high, no-one can see you and the 
busy road masks any noise that I 
make. 
This would be a perfect target. 
Passers by can’t see in so 
they wouldn’t notice you 
breaking in. The high gate and 
hedges block the view so no-
one can see what is going on 
inside. 
Open fences 
would put me off.
I’d feel more 
exposed 
if the walls and 
fences 
were lower.
Surveillance –
don’t like the true cul-de-sac
If it's a cul-de-sac 
then it's usually one 
way in, one way out. 
You'd be stupid to do 
a cul-de-sac. 
I wouldn’t target houses on a 
cul-de-sac because you feel 
trapped and it’s difficult if 
someone challenges you. 
They might say ‘what are 
you doing?’ and you say you 
are lost and then you have to 
walk back out the way you 
came in and they are looking 
at you. 
The principles of CPTED
Physical security 
Secured by Design Homes
Physical security – Part 2 of SBD 

Physical security –
don’t like good quality locks
The hinges are on the 
outside of that door for 
God’s sake, it’s a 3 
minute job. It’s a 
cheap arse door that 
one! 
Yes, I can tell by 
looking at the lock 
that it would be 
easy to snap. 
This lock can 
easily be mole-
gripped. You can 
tell because it’s 
thin. The new ones 
are chunkier. 
I would snap the 
cylinder on the 
side door – it’s a 
really poor design 
is that door. 
If manufacturers 
know that we can 
mole grip a lock, 
why don’t they 
change that lock 
to make it harder 
to break in?
Having mole grips 
is like having the 
key to the door!
Physical security –
not deterred by burglar alarms
Good alarms like *** don’t 
stop when you pull them off 
the wall. 
The cheap ones do!
Physical security –
attracted to excessive security
The security grille 
makes me think 
there’s something 
worth taking. 
The principles of CPTED
Through movement
Secured by Design Homes 
“Whilst it is accepted that through routes will be included within 
development layouts, the designer must ensure that the security 
of the development is not compromised by excessive 
permeability.”
“Footpaths linking culs-de- sac to one another can be particularly 
problematic, and in such cases the layout may need to be re-
considered.”

Through movement -
gives them legitimacy 
Yes, this is perfect! Easy 
pickings. I would first walk 
up and down this footpath. 
No-one would give me a 
second glance. Even if I 
was a tramp walking up 
and down I wouldn’t look 
out of place – it’s a 
footpath, no-one can 
question you. 
If I was in there and the police 
came I would 
be boxed in and wouldn't 
have an excuse for being 
in there. I couldn't say 'I'm just 
walking home Officer’ 
Through movement –
allows them to evade police 
Burglars like 
footpaths, it 
makes it easy as 
the police can’t get 
there easily
Having ginnels on an 
estate is great, cos you 
know the area better 
than the police, you’ll 
easily lose them. You 
know the routes!
Those ginnels and 
footpaths are 
more or less an 
escape route.
The appeal of a 
footpath is that you 
know how you are 
getting in and how you 
escape
Through movement -
don’t have to retrace their steps
On a cul-de-sac, 
you have to walk 
back out the way 
you came in. 
I wouldn’t go further into the 
cul-de-sac. There is no reason 
to be on a cul-de-sac unless 
you live there. You aren’t going 
anywhere so you are a 
stranger. If it’s a through road 
you can just keep walking 
through. 
If it’s a cul-de-sac 
it’s usually one way 
in, one way out. 
You’d be stupid to 
do a cul-de-sac.
The principles of CPTED
Defensible space 
Secured by Design Homes 
“Where it is desirable to limit access/use to residents and their 
legitimate visitors, features such as rumble strips, change of 
road surface (by colour or texture), pillars, brick piers or 
narrowing of the carriageway may be used”.

Defensible space –
don’t like feeling that everyone knows each other 
People living here will 
have a bee in their 
bonnet. This is a private 
road for private people. 
I would feel awkward 
here. It’s all about the 
bluff and I couldn’t pull it 
off here. 
If a burglar had anything about 
them they’d know that all the 
people that live in those 
houses know each other and 
would be chatting to each 
other.
Everyone that lives there will 
be focused on the entrance 
and what goes on. They’ll all 
know each other, keep an eye 
out for each other, give the key 
to the coal man – that sort of 
thing.  
I wouldn’t go up this 
street it’s far too 
open. 
But…...
1) Implementation of Defensible Space
2) The concept of 
Management/Maintenance

Defensible space –
‘private road’
The ‘private road’ 
just means they 
have something to 
protect, so 
something to steal.  
‘Private road’ 
suggests this 
isn’t council 
housing so won’t
be on benefits. 
The word ‘private’ 
makes me think it’s an 
exclusive area and they 
have more money. 
That would attract me. 
I’d think ‘private 
road’ means 
they’ve got coin. 
It’s a ‘Private Road’, 
this tells me they’ve 
bought houses, no 
council ones. 
‘Private Road’ 
tells me they’ve 
bought their 
house – it’s not 
council.
‘Private Road’ means they 
all bought their houses. You 
don’t get rented properties 
on a Private Road do you. 

Management and maintenance
No, it doesn’t look 
worth breaking into 
as there would be 
nothing to take. 
No, it’s too scruffy 
there is nothing 
worth taking. 
No, they would have 
nothing to steal. 
If the house is well 
looked after, it tells 
me they’ve got 
money!
No, I wouldn’t burgle this 
house. I would try and 
offer them help! Phone 
the council and get them 
some support! 
No – I wouldn’t be 
in that area 
burgling. I’d go in 
with nothing and 
come out with 
nothing.
They look methed out. 
I wouldn’t go there. 
They are scruffy 
b@stards they aren’t 
going to have owt. 
Look at the state of 
that garden.
Those gardens are dirty 
and horrible, that’d put me 
off – you want a nice tidy 
garden, if you mow your 
lawn, you care for your 
house and will have nice 
things. 
Individual design elements 
Evaluating the effectiveness of SBD
Does it work?
Evaluating Secured by Design 
(as a scheme)
Evaluation Key findings Issue/problem
Armitage 2000 -55% reduction in crime (refurbs)
-Burglary 71% higher NSBD
-Total crime 34% higher NSBD
-Self reported burglary  8.4% 
(NSBD), 2.9% (SBD) 
Sample built 1994-
1998
Pascoe 1999 Burglary 31% higher NSBD Sample built pre-
1999
Brown 1999 SBD 40% fewer burglaries/vehicle 
crime 
Sample built pre-
1999
Teedon and Reid 
2009
SBD total housebreaking fell 61%
NSBD fell 21%
Just Part 2 (windows 
and doors)
What’s the problem?
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SBD as an Evolving Standard
SBD estates 
experienced 171% 
of burglary of 
non-SBD estates
SBD estates 
experienced 130% 
of burglary of 
non-SBD estates SBD estates 
experienced 97% 
of burglary of 
non-SBD estates SBD estates 
experienced 51% 
of burglary of 
non-SBD estates
SBD estates 
experienced 47% 
of burglary of 
non-SBD estates
Evaluation of Secured by Design in 
West Yorkshire
Armitage and Monchuk (2009)
Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009)
Sample
Most recent
SBD developments 
built 2006/2007 342 properties
All properties in 
West Yorkshire 867,885 properties
Police recorded 
crime
Matched pairs
16 SBD 
developments 342 properties 
Police reported 
crime 
Self reported crime 
16 Non-SBD 
developments 253 properties
Same street 11 developments (SBD and Non-SBD)
101 properties (SBD)
354 (Non-SBD 
properties)
Police recorded 
crime
Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009)
Most recent
SBD 
developments 
built 2006/2007
Burglary rate of 
5.8 per 1000
All properties in 
West Yorkshire
Burglary rate of 
22.7 per 1000
Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009)
Sample
Most recent
SBD developments 
built 2006/2007 342 properties
All properties in 
West Yorkshire 867,885 properties
Police recorded 
crime
Matched pairs
16 SBD 
developments 342 properties 
Police reported 
crime 
Self reported crime 
16 Non-SBD 
developments 253 properties
Same street 11 developments (SBD and Non-SBD)
101 properties (SBD)
354 (Non-SBD 
properties)
Police recorded 
crime
Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009)
Matched pairs
16 SBD 
developments
129 crimes per 
1000                       
6 burglaries per 
1000
3% reported 
burglary
16 Non-SBD 
developments
166 crimes per 
1000 8 burglaries 
per 1000
6% reported 
burglary
Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009)
Sample
Most recent
SBD developments 
built 2006/2007 342 properties
All properties in 
West Yorkshire 867,885 properties
Police recorded 
crime
Matched pairs
16 SBD 
developments 342 properties 
Police reported 
crime 
Self reported crime 
16 Non-SBD 
developments 253 properties
Same street 11 developments (SBD and Non-SBD)
101 properties (SBD)
354 (Non-SBD 
properties)
Police recorded 
crime
Secured by Design in West Yorkshire (2009)
Same street
11 SBD 
developments
118 crimes per 1000
0 burglaries
11 Non-SBD 
developments
263 crimes per 1000
14 burglaries per 
1000
Individual design elements 
Issues/problems to consider 
Evaluation:
1. CPTED delivery varies across forces.
2. SBD as a changing standard.
3. Recording SBD developments
As a crime reduction measure:
1. Are offenders interpreting principles as expected?
2. Risk of losing the role.
3. Commitment from senior management…...!!!
It’s not sexy. You don’t go there on a 
blue light. 
It’s not going to get you a 
promotion between Inspector 
and Chief Inspector so they are not 
interested in it. 
Thank-you
r.a.armitage@hud.ac.uk
@DrRArmitage
